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MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY:  
A SUMMARY*
Mahdi Ebrahimi Kahou† and Alfred Lehar‡
SUMMARY
The 2007 global financial crisis brought sharply into focus the need for 
macroprudential policy as a means of controlling systemic financial stability. 
This has become a focal point for policy-makers and numerous central 
banks, including the Bank of Canada, but it has its drawbacks, particularly 
here in Canada.
As a counterbalance to microprudential policy, the idea of a macroprudential 
outlook reaches beyond the notion that as long as every banking institution 
is healthy, financial stability is assured. Macroprudential policy recognizes 
that all those financial institutions are linked, and that stability at the 
individual level may translate to fragility and uncertainty at the macro level.
There are two approaches to macroprudential policy, and both come with 
downsides. One approach examines the network factor, in which banks are 
linked through their inter-connected financial transactions. A domino effect 
can thus be created; when one bank defaults, it causes a chain reaction 
down the line, creating instability in other banks in the network. The extent 
of this contagion of instability can be clearly observed through this model; 
unfortunately, it requires the use of detailed information typically available 
only to a limited circle of bank supervisors.
The second approach gleans information from bank stock prices in a poorly 
performing market. This information is easily available and accessed, but 
the downside is the lack of clear understanding on how exactly these shocks travel 
through the complex links of the global banking system.
Canada’s banking system is small and has only six major banks. However, it is 
important to understand how they are interconnected and how each individual bank 
can contribute to overall risk. Not only do banks need to be sufficiently capitalized in 
the normal business cycle, but it may be worthwhile for the sake of overall financial 
stability to create mechanisms, as regulators in some countries are doing, that 
require banks to hold more capital in good economic times so that they can use it as 
a buffer in case of a downturn. 
Another important macroprudential tool is to identify how much each bank 
contributes to systemic risk. This would entail identifying the banks that pose a 
greater threat to stability and having them hold extra capital. Assigning proper 
capital requirements is, however, not as straightforward as it may seem as the risk 
of the banking system changes when capital requirements change. One study has 
shown that when properly done such a requirement can reduce by one-quarter the 
probability of a financial crisis.
Implementing macroprudential policy in Canada faces some challenges. With both 
housing prices and the level of Canadians’ personal debt high, sudden corrections 
to the financial system can create problems. Also, the interconnections between 
Canadian and foreign banks could result in the former being much more greatly 
influenced by financial-crisis spillover from the latter, something Canada generally 
avoided during the 2007 economic meltdown. 
There’s no consensus as yet on the objectives of macroprudential policy. However, 
it is a necessary complement to microprudential policy and provides a means of 
managing systemic risk with the goal of greater global financial stability.
1Banks, as institutions whose operations consist of granting loans and receiving deposits 
from the public, play a crucial role in the allocation of capital and financial intermediation in 
the economy. Significant failures in the financial sector create a severe scarcity in the credit 
supply, and raise the cost of intermediation, which consequently causes unpleasant economic 
fluctuations. The 2007 global financial crisis highlighted some shortcomings of the regulatory 
framework at the time, specifically its inability to address the stability of the financial system 
as a whole. Macroprudential policy, as an attempt to address this concern, has become a 
mandate for policy-makers and central banks, from the Central Bank of Japan and Thailand 
to the U.S. Federal Reserve and Bank of Canada.
The origin of the term “macroprudential” can be traced back to the late 1970s. One of 
the major concerns at that time in financial regulatory circles was the rapid growth of 
loans to developing countries and their potentially negative impact on financial stability. 
Macroprudential policy is a complement to microprudential policy for safeguarding financial 
stability. The logic behind a pure microprudential orientation suffers from severe fallacies of 
composition. One of the main assumptions of the microprudential framework is that financial 
stability is ensured as long as every institution is sound. However, due to the interconnection 
of financial institutions, what may look stable at the individual level can be fragile and 
unstable at the macro level. 
Policy-makers and academics have not yet achieved universal consensus on the objectives 
of macroprudential policy. However, three growing crucial concerns should be addressed 
through macroprudential policies: financial stability, systemic risk and procyclicality of the 
financial sector.
Systemic risk as one of the main factors in assessing financial stability is a fairly new concept 
in the central banks’ and policy-makers’ circles. However, the attempt to define and evaluate 
systemic risk in the financial system can be traced back to the mid-1990s. Some of the early 
definitions of systemic risk focus on a substantial disruption of confidence and information 
in the banking sector and consequently, in the financial sector. The most recent approaches 
define systemic risk as the risk of a correlated and simultaneous failure of a significant portion 
of the banking sector. Today, there are two main approaches of measuring systemic risk:
NETWORK-BASED APPROACH: 
In this class of models, banks are seen as nodes in a network that are linked by inter-bank 
obligations such as loans or derivatives. When one bank defaults, it cannot honour the 
obligations to its counterparties in full and some of the linked banks might default as a 
consequence. The benefit of this class of models is that the extent of contagion as default 
spreads through the network can be precisely modelled. On the downside, these models 
require detailed information on the individual banks’ risks and exposures to each other. Such 
detailed information is usually only available to bank supervisors.
2STOCK-BASED APPROACH:
This approach infers information from stock prices, for example, by examining bank stock 
returns on days when the whole market performs very poorly. The upside of this approach 
is the availability of stock price information, and the information and views of all market 
participants that are priced into the stocks. Its downside is the lack of detailed understanding 
of how shocks propagate through the system.
The Canadian banking system differs from that of the United States because of its 
concentration. Almost all assets are concentrated among the big six banks, making them all 
system-relevant. Nevertheless, in the authors’ opinion, some effort should be made to see the 
Canadian system as a whole and identify the contributions that each of the banks makes to 
the overall risk. 
Macroprudential regulation has to address two dimensions. On the time dimension, 
regulators have to ensure that banks are adequately capitalized throughout the business cycle. 
In its 2009 annual report, the Bank for International Settlements defines procyclicality as “the 
fact that, over time, the dynamics of the financial system and of the real economy reinforce 
each other, increasing the amplitude of booms and busts and undermining stability in both 
the financial sector and the real economy.” Banks tend to engage in riskier investments and 
provide excessive loans in good times, due to under-estimation of risk in the market. By 
contrast, in bad times they tend to shrink lending, due to over-estimation of risk. In several 
countries, regulators are experimenting with mechanisms that require banks to hold more 
capital in boom times that can serve as an extra buffer in a downturn.
In the cross-sectional dimension of macroprudential regulations, capital has to be allocated 
across the banking system, such that the banks that pose a greater threat to financial stability 
hold more capital. Identifying system-relevant banks and forcing them to hold more capital 
than other banks is one mechanism to mitigate systemic risk. One important consideration in 
this context is that the risk of the system changes once capital gets reallocated in the banking 
system. When system-relevant banks are forced to hold more capital, systemic risk changes 
and the risk contributions of individual banks change. New banks might consequently emerge 
as being system-relevant. In a 2012 study for the large Canadian banks, Gauthier, Lehar 
and Souissi found that such macroprudential capital requirements can differ substantially 
from a simpler one-shot identification of system-relevant banks. They also document that 
macroprudential capital requirements can differ as much as 25 per cent from observed capital 
levels and have the potential to reduce the probability of a financial crisis by about one-quarter.
We see two challenges for macroprudential stability in Canada. First, housing prices and 
Canadians’ personal debt levels are high. Any sudden corrections might pose a challenge 
for the financial system. In our opinion, policy-makers should continue to address this time-
series aspect of systemic risk. Second, we believe that spillovers from outside of Canada 
can pose a threat to the banking system. While the Canadian banking system was not 
severely implicated in the recent financial crisis, stronger linkages may pose a larger threat to 
Canadian financial stability in the future. 
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